We propose a novel semantics for logic programs with negation by viewing the application of a clause in a derivation as an action in the situation calculus. Program clauses are then identi ed with situation calculus effect axioms as they are understood in axiomatic theories of actions. We then solve the frame problem for these e ect axioms using a recent approach of Reiter 21], and identify the resulting collection of axioms with the semantics of the original logic program. An interesting consequence of this approach is that the logic programming negation-as-failure operator inherits its nonmonotonicity from the nonmonotonicity associated with the frame problem. One advantage of our proposal is that like Clark's completion semantics, ours is also formulated explicitly in classical logic. To illustrate the usefulness of our semantics, we prove su cient conditions for two logic programs to be equivalent, and use this to verify the correctness of the well-known unfolding program transformation operator. We also discuss applications of this framework to formalizing search control operators in logic programming. / Keywords. Semantics of logic programs. Reasoning about actions. The situation calculus. The frame problem.
Introduction
In this paper we propose a novel semantics for logic programs in the situation calculus. One of the advantages of our proposal is that like Clark's completion semantics, it is explicitly formulated in classical logic. For this reason, it is suitable for proving properties of logic programs such as the correctness of various program transformation operators.
The basic idea of our proposal is very simple. We consider the application of a clause in a derivation to be an action in the situation calculus (McCarthy 15] ). Executing a clause makes the head of the clause true in the new situation whenever the body of the clause is true in the current situation. Program clauses are then identi ed with situation calculus e ect axioms as they are understood in axiomatic theories of actions. We then solve the frame problem for these e ect axioms using a recent approach of Reiter 21] , and identify the resulting collection of axioms with the semantics of the original logic program.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we brie y review the situation calculus and the frame problem. Section 3 provides the necessary logical preliminaries, and Section 4 de nes our situation calculus semantics for logic programs. Section 5 shows some relationships between our semantics and Wallace's 31], and also relates our semantics to the stable model semantics 3]. Section 6 formulates conditions for two logic programs to be equivalent and applies this result to verifying the correctness of the unfolding program transformation operator. Section 7 discusses other potential applications of our semantics, while Section 8 provides some concluding remarks.
2. An Informal Introduction to the Situation Calculus 1 
Intuitive Ontology for the Situation Calculus
The situation calculus ( McCarthy 15] ) is a rst order language (with, as we shall see later, some second order features) speci cally designed for representing dynamically changing worlds. All changes to the world are the result of named actions. A possible world history, which is simply a sequence of actions, is represented by a rst order term called a situation. The constant S 0 is used to denote the initial situation, namely that situation in which no actions have yet occurred. There is a distinguished binary function symbol do; do( ; s) denotes the successor situation to s resulting from performing the action . Actions may be parameterized. For example, put(x; y) might stand for the action of putting object x on object y, in which case do(put(A; B); s) denotes the situation resulting from placing A on B when the world is in situation s. Notice that in the situation calculus, actions are denoted by rst order terms, and situations (world histories) are also rst order terms. For example, do(putdown(A); do(walk(L); do(pickup(A); S 0 ))) is a situation denoting the world history consisting of the sequence of actions pickup(A), walk(L), putdown(A)]. Notice that the sequence of actions in a history, in the order in which they occur, is obtained from a situation term by reading o the actions from right to left.
Generally, the values of relations in a dynamic world will vary from one situation to the next. Such relations are called uents, and are denoted by predicate symbols taking a situation term as one of their arguments. The convention we shall adopt is that the situation argument of a uent will always be its last argument. For example, in a mobile robot environment, we might have a relational uent closeTo(r; x; s) meaning that in situation s the robot r is close to the object x.
Here, R is a rst order formula specifying the contextual conditions under which the action A will have its speci ed e ect on F.
A solution to the frame problem is a systematic procedure for generating, from these e ect axioms, all the frame axioms. If possible, we also want a parsimonious representation for these frame axioms (because in their simplest form, there are too many of them).
A Simple Solution to the Frame Problem
By appealing to earlier ideas of Haas 5] , Schubert 24] and Pednault 19] , Reiter 21] proposes a simple solution to the frame problem, which we illustrate with an example. Suppose that (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) are all the e ect axioms for the uent broken, i.e. they describe all the ways that an action can change the truth value of broken. We can rewrite (2.1) and (2.2) in the logically equivalent form:
Poss(a; s)^ (9r)fa = drop(r; x)^fragile(x; s)g _(9b)fa = explode(b)^nexto(b; x; s)g]
broken(x; do(a; s)): (2.4) Similarly, consider the negative e ect axiom (2.3) for broken; this can be rewritten as:
Poss(a; s)^(9r)a = repair(r; x) :broken(x; do(a; s)):
(2.5) In general, we can assume that the e ect axioms for a uent F have been written in the forms:
Poss(a; s)^ + F (x; a; s) F(x; do(a; s)); (2.6) Poss(a; s)^ ?
F (x; a; s) :F(x; do(a; s)): (2.7) Here + F (x; a; s) is a formula describing under what conditions doing the action a in situation s leads the uent F to become true in the successor situation do(a; s); similarly ?
F (x; a; s) describes the conditions under which performing a in s results in F becoming false in the next situation. The solution to the frame problem of 21] rests on a completeness assumption, which is that the causal axioms (2.6) and (2.7) characterize all the conditions under which action a can lead to a uent F(x) becoming true (respectively, false) in the successor situation. In other words, axioms (2.6) and (2.7) describe all the causal laws a ecting the truth values of the uent F. Therefore, if action a is possible and F(x)'s truth value changes from false to true as a result of doing a, then + F (x; a; s) must be true and similarly for a change from true to false. Reiter 21] shows how to derive a successor state axiom of the following form from the causal axioms (2.6) and (2.7) and the completeness assumption.
Successor State Axiom
Poss (a; s) F(x; do(a; s)) + F (x; a; s) _ (F(x; s)^: ?
F (x; a; s))] This single axiom embodies a solution to the frame problem. Notice that this axiom universally quanti es over actions a. In fact, this is one way in which a parsimonious solution to the frame problem is obtained.
Applying this to our example about breaking things, we obtain the following successor state axiom:
Poss(a; s) broken(x; do(a; s)) (9r)fa = drop(r; x)^fragile(x; s)g _ (9b)fa = explode(b)^nexto(b; x; s)g _ broken(x; s)^:(9r)a = repair(r; x)]: It is important to note that the above solution to the frame problem presupposes that there are no state constraints, as for example in the blocks world constraint: (8s):on(x; y; s) :on(y; x; s). Such constraints sometimes implicitly contain e ect axioms (so-called indirect e ects), in which case the above completeness assumption will not be true.
In what follows, we shall provide a semantics for logic programs, with negation, by treating the application of a rule (clause) in a derivation as an action in the situation calculus. Program clauses will then be identi ed with e ect axioms. By solving the frame problem exactly as just described, we shall obtain a situation calculus representation of the program which will serve as the program's logical semantics.
As is well known, solutions to the frame problem are nonmonotonic, in the sense that the above completeness assumption (the given e ect axioms are all and only the e ect axioms) is a kind of closed world assumption. The addition of a new e ect axiom to an earlier axiomatization for some domain may invalidate any solution to the frame problem obtained with the earlier axioms. This intuition has led to a large body of research on nonmonotonic solutions to the frame problem (e.g. 16, 26, 8, 9, 13] ). In view of our situation calculus semantics for logic programming, it will follow that negation-as-failure inherits its nonmonotonicity from the nonmonotonicity associated with the frame problem.
Logical Preliminaries 3.1. The Language of the Situation Calculus
The language L of the situation calculus is many-sorted, second-order, with equality.
We assume the following sorts: situation for situations, action for actions, and object for everything else. We also assume the following domain independent predicates and functions: A constant S 0 of sort situation denoting the initial situation. A binary function do -do(a; s) denotes the situation resulting from performing action a in situation s. A binary predicate Poss -Poss(a; s) means that action a is possible (executable) in situation s. In this paper we shall assume that actions are always executable, i.e. (8a; s)Poss(a; s). So technically, there is no real need for this predicate in this paper. We keep it, however, in order to be consistent with the general framework of (Reiter 21 ] and Lin and Reiter 11]). A binary predicate < over situations. We shall follow convention, and write < in in x form. By s < s 0 we mean that s 0 can be obtained from s by a sequence of executable actions. As usual, s s 0 will be a shorthand for s < s 0 _ s = s 0 .
We assume a nite number of uents, which are predicate symbols of arity object n situation, n 0, and are domain dependent. We also assume a nite number of function symbols of arity object n ! action, n 0, for actions, and a nite number of function symbols of arity object n ! object, n 0.
Axiomatizing the Situation Calculus
We shall need the following foundational axioms (Lin and Reiter 11]) for the situation calculus:
do(a 1 ; s 1 ) = do(a 2 ; s 2 ) (a 1 = a 2^s1 = s 2 ); (8P) P(S 0 )^(8a; s)(P(s) P(do(a; s))) (8s)P(s)];
:s < S 0 ; s < do(a; s 0 ) (Poss(a; s 0 )^s s 0 ): Intuitively, the rst two axioms are unique names assumptions. They eliminate cycles, and merging. The third axiom is second order induction. It amounts to the domain closure axiom that every situation is obtained from the initial one by repeatedly applying the function do. 3 As we shall see, induction will play an important role in this paper. The last two axioms de ne < inductively.
Notice the similarity between these axioms and the Peano foundational axioms for number theory. However, unlike Peano arithmetic which has a unique successor function, we have a class of successor functions here represented by the function do. In the following, we shall denote by the set of the above axioms.
Logic Programs
An atom p is an expression of the form F(t 1 ; :::; t n ), where F is a uent of arity object n situation, and t 1 ; : : :; t n are terms of sort object. Notice that an atom is not a formula in the situation calculus. It is an expression obtained from an atomic situation calculus formula by suppressing its situation argument.
A literal is either an atom, or an expression of the form not p, where p is an atom. In addition, an equality formula of the form t = t 0 is a literal, where t and t 0 are terms of sort object. Again, notice that, except for equality literals, literals are not formulas in the language of the situation calculus.
A goal G is an expression of the form l 1 & & l n where n 0, and l 1 ; : : :; l n are literals. A clause is an expression of the form F(x) :-G where F is a uent symbol,x is a tuple of distinct variables of length n, n 0, and G is a goal. Notice that according to this de nition, the head of a clause must not mention constants and compound terms. This, however, does not restrict the generality of our notion of clauses. For any terms t 1 ; :::; t n of sort object, we can take an expression of the form F(t 1 ; :::; t n ) :-G to be a shorthand for the following clause:
F(x) :-x =t & G wherex = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) is a tuple of fresh variables not mentioned in G or int. Generally, for any vectorst = (t 1 ; :::; t k ) andt 0 = (t 0 1 ; :::; t 0 k ) of terms of the same length, ift =t 0 appears in a goal, then it stands for t 1 = t 0 1 & & t k = t 0 k ; and ift =t 0 appears in a situation calculus formula, then it stands for t 1 = t 0 1^ ^t k = t 0 k :
Finally, a normal program is a nite set of clauses. In the following, normal programs will simply be called programs. The de nition of a uent symbol F in a program P is the set of clauses in P that mention F in their head.
Since we will be interpreting clauses as formulas of the situation calculus, we need a way to interpret literals in the situation calculus. Given a literal l, and a situation term st, we de ne l st] as follows:
1. If l is an atom of the form F(t 1 ; :::; t n ), then l st] is F(t 1 ; :::; t n ; st), i.e. it is the formula obtained from l by putting st back as its last argument. 2. If l is a negated atom of the form not F(t 1 ; :::; t n ), then l st] is the formula :(9s)F(t 1 ; :::; t n ; s). Notice that in this case, the truth value of the formula l st] is independent of the situation st. This is our interpretation of the negation-as-failure operator \not" in the situation calculus.
3. If l is an equality formula of the form t = t 0 , then l st] is l. Now if G is a goal of the form l 1 & &l n , and st a situation term, then we de ne G st] to be the formula The Clark completion of a program P is then the set consisting of the following axioms:
1. For each predicate F in P, the Clark completion of F in P. 2. Unique names axioms for the function symbols appearing in P. Clark's completion is perhaps the simplest semantics for logic programs. It replaces rules in a logic program by logical axioms in rst-order logic. The main problem with it is that it is too weak for logic programs with cycles and recursion (see, for example, 14]).
Our proposed semantics will be very much in the same style as Clark's completion, but it will also handle cycles and recursion correctly.
A Situation Calculus Semantics for Logic Programs
On our intuition about logic programs, clauses are treated as rules, so that the application of such a rule in the process of obtaining a derivation is like performing an action. So a clause of the form F(x) :-G is like the speci cation of the e ects of an action; if G holds currently, then F(x) will hold after the action is performed. Taking this intuition seriously, suppose that we name this clause by the action A(x) in our situation calculus language. Then we have the following axiom (an e ect axiom) describing the e ect of A:
Poss(A(x); s) (G s] F(x; do(A(x); s)): Recall from section 3.1 that we have assumed that actions are always possible:
Poss(a; s) true: Thus the above e ect axiom is equivalent to G s] F(x; do(A(x); s)): Letỹ be the tuple of variables in G which are not inx, then we can rewrite the above axiom as (9ỹ)G s]^a = A(x) F(x; do(a; s)): (4.1) Notice the similarity, but not the formal identity, between this transformation and that leading up to the formation of the Clark completion of a predicate. grandfather(x; y; do(a; s)):
Now suppose that P is a program and F a uent. Suppose the following are the corresponding e ect axioms of the form (4.1) for the clauses in the de nition of F in P:
. . .
Then, by solving the frame problem for uent F as described in Section 2.4, we obtain the following successor state axiom for F:
Intuitively, the successor state axiom for F says that the uent is true in a successor situation i either it is true in the current situation, or the action names one of the clauses in the de nition of F and the body of that clause is true in the current situation. In particular, if the de nition of F in the program P is empty, then (4.2) becomes F(x; do(a; s)) F(x; s):
In the following, we call (4.2) the successor state axiom for F with respect to P. Notice the similarity between this axiom and the Clark completion of F.
We can now de ne the \meaning" of logic programs in the situation calculus. We assume that for each clause there is a unique action symbol that names the clause, and has the same number of arguments as that of the predicate in the head of the clause. where is the set of foundational axioms given in Section 3.2.
D ss is the set of successor state axioms for the uents with respect to P. D una is the set consisting of the following unique names axioms: f(x) 6 = g(ỹ) (4.3) for every pair f; g of distinct function symbols, and f(x) = f(ỹ) x =ỹ (4.4) for every function symbol f. Notice that constants are considered to be 0-ary functions. We remark that for the function do, (4.4) is the same as one of our foundational axioms in . We also remark that D una includes unique names axioms for the actions introduced to name the program clauses.
fF(x; S 0 ) false j F is a uentg:
In other words, in the initial situation, all uents are false.
Notice that only the set D ss of successor state axioms is dependent on the clauses in P. All other sets in the above de nition either are domain independent or depend only on the vocabulary of P. This informs us that if a uent ever becomes true, it will never again become false. 
where G is the result of simultaneously substituting for variables in G according to , andx are all the free variables mentioned in G .
Therefore query answering in logic programs literally becomes planning in the style of (Green 4] ) in the situation calculus.
As we can see from this de nition of an answer, we are primarily interested in consequences of the form (9s)G s]. One nice property about these consequences of action theories is that they commute over conjunctions: Now (x; a; s) is a disjunction of formulas of the form (9ỹ)G s]^a = A(x), where G is a goal. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, (8x; a; s 0 ): (x; a; s) (x; a; f(s 0 ; s)): This completes the proof of the lemma. Now, to prove the proposition, notice rst that by the properties of rst order logic, the following is valid:
it is su cient, with no loss of generality, to show that for any two uents F and F 0 , D j = (8x;ỹ)f(9s)F(x; s)^(9s)F 0 (ỹ; s) (9s) F(x; s)^F 0 (ỹ; s)]g:
To prove this, assume (9s)F(X; s) and (9s)F 0 (Ỹ ; s) for vectorsX andỸ of Skolem constants. Then for constants and 0 , we have F(X; ) and F 0 (Ỹ ; 0 ). We must prove (9s Thus we can distinguish two classes of models of the action theory for P 2 , one in which :(9s)Q(s) holds so the rst rule is applicable but not the second, and the other in which :(9s)F(s) holds so the second rule is applicable, but not the rst. These rst order sentences entail (9s)R(s), so that R is an answer to this program.
When there is recursion, our action theory may be stronger than Clark's completion, as the following example shows. This shows that our semantics is strictly stronger than Clark's completion. Now consider the program P 2 which is P 1 together with the following clauses:
childless ( In the next section, we shall show that our action theory semantics for logic programs is closely related to a recent semantics proposed by Wallace 31] , and is essentially the same as the stable model semantics 3] when we consider only Herbrand models.
Wallace's Semantics
Wallace's basic idea 31] can be summarized as follows: Given a logic program P, rst obtain from P another program P 0 , then consider the semantics of P to be the Clark completion of P 0 . Wallace proposes several ways for obtaining the new program P 0 from P. We shall consider the one that is most closely related to our semantics, and that will in turn relate our semantics to the stable model semantics of 3].
The following de nition is adapted from 31]. Let P be a logic program. The tightened program P 0 of P contains precisely the following clauses:
1. (8x)(F(x) (9n)F(x; n)); and the following completion axiom for F(x; n): (8x; n)(F(x; n) (9n 0 )(n = s(n 0 )^Q(x; n 0 ))^:R(x)): Notice the similarity between this axiom and our successor state axiom for the uent F, in particular, when R(x) in the above axiom is replaced by (9n 0 )R(x; n 0 ) according to the completion of R(x). The di erences are that instead of situations, Wallace uses natural numbers, and instead of actions and the function do, Wallace uses the successor function.
We assume that 0 is a constant symbol denoting the number zero. So the Herbrand models of the Clark completion of tightened programs contains precisely the following terms about numbers: 0; s(0); s(s(0)); ::: Notice that by our construction of M 0 , (1) follows straightforwardly from (2). To prove the \)" part of (2), suppose that for some natural number N, M j = F(t; N). We show by induction on N that there is a situation S such that M 0 j = F(t; S). The case for N = 0 is vacuous because M j = :F(t; 0). Inductively, suppose this is true for any predicate F 0 , and any N < K. Suppose now M j = F(t; K). Then since M is a model of the Clark completion of the tightened version of P, there must be a clause with F as its head, say F(x) :-F 1 (t 1 ) & not F 2 (t 2 ) in P such that for some tupleũ of Herbrand terms of the same length asỹ, the tuple of variables in the above clause, but di erent from those inx, M j = F 1 (t 1 ; K ? 1)(x;ỹ=t;ũ)^:(9n)F 2 (t 2 ; n)(x;ỹ=t;ũ): By the inductive assumption, there is a situation S 1 such that M 0 j = F 1 (t 1 ; S 1 )(x;ỹ=t;ũ). Now let A(x) be the action naming the above clause for F. By the construction of M 0 , we have that M 0 j = F(t; do(A(t); S 1 )). This completes the inductive step, thus the \)" part of (2). The \(" part of (2) can be proved similarly by doing induction on situations.
This completes the proof for the rst half of the theorem. 
(t), F(t) 2 S i M j = (9s)F(t; s).
For any logic program P, Wallace also de nes the full completion of P to be the Clark completion of the tightened version of P together with appropriate induction axioms for natural numbers, and shows that for any ground atom p, p is entailed by the full completion i it is in the success set of the tight tree semantics of P as de ned in (van Gelder 28]), and :p is entailed by the full completion i p is in the nite failure set of P. Since our foundational axioms in already include an induction axiom, this result carries over to our semantics as well.
Wallace 31] also relates his semantics to some other well-known ones such as (Fitting 2], Kunen 6 ], Przymusinski 20] , and van Gelder and Ross and Schlipf 29]). Many of the results there can be inherited here. Wallace also argues the advantages of having a semantics in rst-order logic. The same arguments apply to our semantics as well.
Admittedly, compared to Wallace's elegant approach, ours seems complicated. However, there are some important reasons for appealing to actions and their axiomatization within the situation calculus.
1. Appealing to theories of actions as they are normally understood in arti cial intelligence reveals the connection between the classical frame problem and the semantics for negation-as-failure. 2. By treating rule applications as rst-order objects, we can formally reason about them within the situation calculus. This becomes important when we come to formalize search control operators in logic programming. Because actions and situations are rst order terms, and because a situation denotes the sequence of actions (history) that have occurred thus far, a situation in our logic programming semantics is a record of all the derivations that have been performed thus far, in the order in which they have been performed. To date, most formal analyses of logic programming have ignored their \dirty aspects" like the cut operator. In essence, these operators place certain constraints on reachable situations, i.e. on the permitted derivation histories. These conditions are normally rather complicated and require the ability to talk formally about derivation histories, which our situation calculus-based semantics does provide. We shall say more about this issue in Section 7 below. Technically, this paper also goes beyond that of (Wallace 31]) in de ning an equivalence relation on logic programs, and proving conditions for two logic programs to be equivalent. This is the goal of the next section.
Program Transformations
One reason for a formal semantics of a programming language is to study sound program transformation techniques. To this end, we rst need a notion of equivalence between two logic programs.
An Equivalence Relation
Let P and P 0 be two programs, and D and D 0 their respective action theories. Normally D and D 0 will not be compatible. For example, any action in P but not in P 0 will have no e ect according to D 0 . Given our de nition of answers to queries, it is natural then to say that P and P 0 are equivalent i they give the same answer to every query, i.e., for any goal G, D j = (9s)G s] i D 0 j = (9s)G s]. However, this de nition does not seem to be ne-grained enough. For example, the following program It is clear that if both T and T 0 are answer theories of P, then T and T 0 are logically equivalent. So if T is an answer theory of P, then we can say that T is the answer theory.
Notice that by Proposition 4. Moreover, according to the results in (Lin and Reiter 12] ), the answer theory of P always exists, and can be expressed as a nite second-order theory, but that in general, no rst-order answer theory need exist. We now have the following de nition: 7
De nition 6.1. Two logic programs P and P 0 are equivalent i their answer theories are logically equivalent. These two theories are not equivalent.
According to Corollary 5.1 that relates our semantics to the stable model semantics, we see, by virtue of Proposition 6.1, that a stable model of a logic program P is a Herbrand model (in the sense of Corollary 5.1) of its answer theory. In particular, in the propositional case, the answer theory of a logic program is simply the disjunction of its stable models; and two programs P and P 0 are equivalent i their stable models are the same: Proposition 6.2. Let P and P 0 be two propositional logic programs.
1. A theory T is the answer theory of P i the set of models of T equals the set of stable models of P. 2. P and P 0 are equivalent i the set of stable models of P equals the set of stable models of P 0 . The following proposition is straightforward: 
Equivalence of De nite Logic Programs
A logic program is de nite if it does not mention any negative atoms in any of its clauses. The conditions for two de nite programs to be equivalent are just as one would expect: P and P 0 are equivalent i P entails each clause in P 0 and vice versa. In our language, we have: This is well-de ned, because P 1 is a de nite program, so (a;x; s) can be evaluated using the truth values of uents in the situation s. In particular, it does not contain formulas like (8s 0 )F(s 0 ). Now it follows directly from the construction that M 0 is a model of the action theory for P 1 . Now we show the \if" part using Proposition 6. We show by induction on s that M 0 ; j = (9s)F(x; s).
The case for s = S 0 is trivial. Inductively, suppose that for any uent, this is true for s . We show that for any action , this is true for do( ; s ) as well. Since M is a model of D, by the form of successor state axioms, there are two cases:
1. M; j = F(x; s ).
2. names one of the clauses in the de nition of F in P, say F(x) :-F 1 (t 1 ) & F 2 (t 2 ) and M; j = (9ỹ):F 1 (t 1 ; s )^F 2 (t 2 ; s ); whereỹ is the tuple of variables mentioned int 1 ort 2 , but not inx. In the rst case, the result follows from our inductive assumption. Suppose it is the latter case. By the inductive assumption, we have This proves that P and P 0 are equivalent.
In principle, checking conditions (6.1) and (6.2) requires induction. However, there are some su cient ways to do this that may be useful in practice. To illustrate the ideas, suppose the program P 0 contains the following clause:
F(x) :-x = f(y) & F 0 (x; g(y)) and we want to verify (6.1) for it. Let a be a fresh constant symbol not already mentioned in P and P 0 . Then one way to do this is to rst add F 0 (f(a); g(a)) to P, and then query the new program with F(f(a)). If the query succeeds, then the condition holds. However, if the query fails, this does not mean that the condition is false. For instance, this condition holds trivially when P is the empty program but G in (6.1) has at least one atom, because when P is empty, its action theory entails :(9s)F(s) for any uent F. This strategy was rst used by Sagiv 23] for proving the equivalence of two deductive databases.
Yet another way to prove condition (6.1) say, is to query the program P with the goal G, and then query P again with the goal F(x) for those bindings returned by the rst query. If the goal F(x) succeeds for all these bindings, then condition (6.1) holds. The problem with this strategy is that it may not work when there are in nitely many bindings for the rst query.
Finally, we remark that if condition (6.1) holds, then D 0 j = (9s)F(t; s) implies D j = (9s)F(t; s), i.e. the set of ground atoms provable from P 0 is a subset of that from P. However, this does not mean that the answer theory of P will entail that of P 0 . For the latter to be true, the set of negative ground atoms provable from P 0 would have to be a subset of that from P as well. In fact, if the answer theory of a positive program entails that of another positive program, then these two positive programs must be equivalent. This is because for any positive program P, the models of the answer theory D of P must be unique in the sense that if two models of D share the same domains, then they must be the same. That in turn is because of the closed world assumption made in logic programs.
Normal Logic Programs
Unfortunately, Theorem 6.1 fails for logic programs with negation: Suppose the program P consists of the following single clause: Intuitively, the reason Theorem 6.1 works for de nite programs is that if F(s) is provable from a de nition program, then there must be a situation s 0 such that s 0 is earlier than s (s 0 < s), and a goal G such that G s 0 ] is provable and does not quantify over situations, i.e. G s 0 ] is a statement whose truth value can be determined by looking at the situation s 0 alone. This will ensure that there are no cycles, and thus induction on situation will work. This property is lost on normal logic programs because if G mentions negation, then G s] will quantify over situations, and its truth value will depend on the entire space of situations. To overcome this, the trick is then to introduce some new situation independent predicates, and replace formulas of the form (9s 0 )F(s 0 ) in G s] by atoms made of such new predicates. This will make the resulting formula \look" like a statement whose truth value depends only on the situation s. This is exactly the intuition behind the following de nitions which will be used to formulate some su cient conditions for two normal logic programs to be equivalent. In the following, we let F be: Then the answer theory of P 1 entails that of P 2 . Let us brie y comment on the theorem before proving it. Condition (6.6) means that if F(s) holds, then there must be a situation s 0 earlier than s such that F (s 0 ) holds. Since F is a simple state formula, its truth value depends only on s 0 , so induction on situations will go through. Compared to Theorem 6.1, F is like G. But since F :-G is a clause in P, condition (6.6) always holds for positive logic programs. Now condition (6.7) is like condition (6.2) We show by induction on s that M 1 ; j = (9s)F(x; s).
The case for s = S 0 is trivial. Inductively, suppose that for any uent, this is true for s . We show that for any action , this is true for do( ; s ) as well. By the construction of M 2 , and the form of successor state axioms, there are two cases:
1. M 2 ; j = F(x; s ). Let F (x; s) be the result of replacing in every positive subformula of the form (9s)F 0 (t; s) by F 0 (t; s), and every negative subformula of the form (9s)F 0 (t; s) by c F 0 (t). Then F satis es the required syntactic conditions: it is a simple state formula, and every uent in it appears positively. By (6.3), it also satis es the condition (6.7). So condition (6.6) is the only one left to be checked.
If has a positive occurrence of (9s)F 1 (t; s), and (9s)F 1 (x; s) 1 (x) is the Clark completion of F 1 , then rst let 0 be the result of replacing in this positive occurrence of (9s)F 1 (t; s) by 1 (t), and let F (x) be obtained from 0 the same way as it is obtained from above. Then F again is a simple state formula, every uent in it appears positively, and satis es condition (6.7). The above procedure of obtaining F can be iterated. Notice that this procedure is closely related to unfolding (see below), and also regression 30, 18, 21] (6.8) We show that the answer theory of P 2 entails that of P 1 . The converse is easier, and can be similarly proved.
Condition (6.5) . Trivial, since every clause in P 1 is also a clause in P 2 .
Conditions (6.7) and (6.6). For each uent F, we use the Clark completion of F in P 1 to generate the formula F as outlined above. As we mentioned, in this case, only Condition (6.6) needs to be proved. There are two cases. If F is di erent from F 1 , then the Clark completion of F in both P 1 and P 2 is the same. Suppose it is (9s)F(s) F . By Corollary 4.2, we have D 2 j = (8s):F(s) (9s 0 )(s 0 < s^ 0 F (s)); where D 2 is the action theory of P 2 , and 0 F is the result of replacing in F every positive subformula of the form (9s)F 0 (t; s) by F 0 (t; s). Now by the construction of F , we have D 2 F j = (8s):F(s) (9s 0 )(s 0 < s^ F (s)); which is the condition (6.6).
For 
Unfold/Fold
Unfold/fold (Tamaki and Sato 27]) are among the best known program transformation operators. Seki 25] shows that they preserve the well-founded semantics of (Van Gelder and Ross and Schlipf 29] ). Using Theorem 6.2, we can show, rather straightforwardly, that unfold/fold also preserve our situation calculus semantics. We illustrate using unfolding. For ease of presentation, we consider only the propositional case. The following de nition is adapted from (Seki 25] ).
Let P be a logic program, and C a clause in P of the form: (6.13) Notice that (6.12) is a consequence of (6.11) and (6.13).
We show that the answer theory of P entails that of P 0 .
Condition (6.5) . We only need to show this for the new clauses C i , 1 i k in 
Other Applications
The framework of this paper is very general; it can be used to formalize many other aspects of logic programming languages. Like most work on the formal semantics of logic programs, we have ignored many \dirty aspects" of the language, such as the cut operator. As mentioned earlier, one of the advantages of treating rules as actions is that we can reason about them as rst-order objects within the logic. This is particularly useful in formalizing many search control operators in logic programming. As an example, we have formalized the cut (!) operator in Prolog using the basic framework proposed here ( 10]).
Brie y, given a de nite logic program P that contains cut, we proceed as follows to provide a semantics for P. First, we ignore cut, and delete all occurrences of ! in P. This will give us a program that does not mention !, so the theory of this paper will be applicable, and an action theory D for it can be constructed. As we emphasized before, in D, situations are derivation histories. However, due to the presence of !, some situations may not be reachable. A logical characterization of cut is then achieved by adding to D a situation calculus sentence that axiomatizes the set of reachable situations. We show that this semantics is well-behaved when the logic program is properly strati ed. Furthermore, according to this semantics, the usual implementation of the negation-as-failure operator using cut is provably correct with respect to the stable model semantics. For details see 10].
We are also currently exploring the possibility of formalizing the dynamic \as-sert" and \retract" operators of Prolog within this framework. It is particularly interesting that once we allow \retract", the resulting theories of actions become much richer in that some actions will now have negative e ects on uents, and issues such as goal interactions in planning become relevant.
Concluding Remarks
By taking seriously the idea that rules are actions, we have formalized the declarative meaning of logic programs in the situation calculus. Like Clark's completion, our situation calculus semantics is formulated in classical logic. Unlike Clark's completion, our semantics is strong enough to handle recursion. Having a classical logical semantics has many advantages, one of which is the relative ease of proving properties of programs. To illustrate this, we have formulated conditions for two logic programs to be equivalent, and used them to prove the correctness of the unfolding transformation of (Tamaki and Sato 27]).
We have also used this framework to formalize various search control operators, and are working on extending it to the dynamic \assert" and \retract" operators of Prolog.
